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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP. v. GOTTSHALL:
"CLOSING THE DOOR" ON FELA CLAIMS
FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BY
LIMITING RECOVERY TO THE "ZONE OF
DANGER"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gott-
shall' recognized negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)2 but limited re-
covery by applying the "zone of danger" test.' This controversial hold-
ing was correct because it balances the liberal recovery policy of
FELA with the legitimate common law concerns of fraudulent claims
and infinite liability.4 This casenote will analyze the history behind
emotional or mental injury claims under FELA and then scrutinize
the Court's reasoning for adopting the restrictive "zone of danger"
test over the more progressive and liberal "bystander" and "genuine-
ness" tests.'
Although the issues in Consolidated Rail Corp. are straight for-
ward, some pertinent background information on FELA and the tort
of negligent infliction of emotional distress would be helpful in facili-
tating a thorough and intelligent discussion. In 1908, Congress passed
FELA in an attempt to shift some of the liability for physical injuries
and deaths caused by the railroad industry away from the employee to
1. 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
2. Codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
3. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2396.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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the employer.6 In imposing a heavier burden upon railroad compa-
nies, Congress reasoned that since the companies were profiting from
their employees' hardships, they should have a duty to provide safe
working conditions.7 The statute eliminated several common law de-
fenses available to the railroads, and in the process advanced its reme-
dial goal of permitting a "liberal" forum in which employees could
bring their negligence claims.8
The shipping industry was incorporated within the scope of
FELA by the Jones Act of 1915.9 "The standard of liability is the same
under both acts, and the case law of the FELA therefore sheds light
on the Jones Act."'10 This note analyzes the case law involving alleged
emotional injuries to both railroad workers and seamen, and therefore
is applicable to actions involving either industry.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress has been recognized in
common law for as long as FELA has been enacted." Since FELA's
inception, courts have been concerned about the possibility of infinite
liability for defendants and the difficulty in substantiating emotional
injuries, both of which encourage fraudulent claims. 2 To limit these
effects on emotional distress claims, courts imposed either the "physi-
cal impact" or the "zone of danger" test.'3 The "physical impact" test,
the majority approach in the early part of this century,' 4 allowed for
6. "Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce ... shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering ... injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier.. ." 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
7. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1908)).
8. In all actions... brought against any such common carrier by railroad ... the fact
that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a re-
covery .... such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employ-
ment ... [and] [a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or
intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability
created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void ....
45 U.S.C. § 53-55 (1988). See also S. REP. No. 460,60th Cong.,lst Sess. 1-3 (1908) (discussing the
abolishment of contributory negligence, the fellow-servant doctrine, and no-fault contracts to
help further FELA's goals).
9. "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may...
maintain an action for damages at law.., and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees shall apply ... " 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1988).
10. Gaston v. Flowers Transp., 866 F.2d 816, 817 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Ferguson v. Moore-
McCormick Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957)).
11. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2405 (1994).
12. Edmund C. Baird, III, No Pain, No Gain; The Third Circuit's "Sufficient Indicia of Gen-
uineness" Approach to Claims of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 1255, 1258-59 (1993).
13. Id. at 1260.
14. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2406.
2
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the recovery of emotional injuries only if the plaintiff suffered a physi-
cal impact.' 5 The "zone of danger" test limits recovery to emotional
distress caused either by physical injury or the imminent apprehension
of physical contact.1 6 Both tests are very restrictive and guard against
the underlying common law concerns.17
In 1968, the California Supreme Court introduced the "by-
stander" recovery test.'8 The three factors used by the court to deter-
mine liability for the emotional distress of bystanders were: (1) the
plaintiff's physical proximity to an accident; (2) whether the emotional
injury resulted from "a sensory and contemporaneous observance of
the accident," and (3) whether a close relationship existed between
the victim and the plaintiff. 19 The "bystander" test has since become
the majority standard in the United States, applied in roughly half the
states. However, several jurisdictions have placed more restrictive
limitations on who may recover.20 This note will analyze the integra-
tion of these two areas of the law by first discussing their historical
unrest in the federal courts and then examining the Supreme Court's
holding in Consolidated Rail Corp., which presents a clear and deci-
sive picture of emotional distress recovery under FELA.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
James E. Gottshall and Alan Carlisle, former employees of Con-
solidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail"), each filed FELA claims
against their former employer for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.2' The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Conrail's sum-
mary judgment against Gottshall and upheld the jury's verdict in favor
of Carlisle.22 Conrail's subsequent appeals led to the consolidation of
both suits for review by the Supreme Court.2 3 The distinct factual situ-
ations of both cases are presented below.
15. Baird, supra note 12, at 1260.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1261.
19. Id.
20. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2407 (1994).
21. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 773 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Carlisle v. Con-
solidated Rail Corp., 790 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
22. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993); Carlisle v. Consoli-
dated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993).
23. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2396.
1995]
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A. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
In the summer of 1988, James Gottshall and his friend Richard
Johns were part of a nine member work crew sent by Conrail to the
Watertown Secondary near Thrbotville, Pennsylvania to replace some
defective track.2 4 The conditioning and age of the crew were not con-
ducive for the strenuous work nor for the hot weather.25 The supervi-
sor, Michael Norvick, forced the crew to work hard and did not give
them any breaks.26 After two and a half hours, Johns collapsed.27 The
record indicated that Conrail knew of Johns' weight problem, high
blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, and his medication needs.28
Johns regained consciousness, only to collapse a second time five min-
utes later.2 9 Gottshall came to Johns' aid and administered CPR, while
Norvick went to get medical assistance.30 Due to communications dif-
ficulties, medical help did not arrive until almost an hour later.3' Johns
had died in the interim. His corpse was covered and laid beside the
track, where Norvick ordered his crew back to work.32 Three hours
later, after the coroner had determined the cause of death to be a
heart attack, Gottshall carried Johns' body to the ambulance.33
Gottshall and Johns had been close friends for fifteen years.34
Fellow employees stated that Gottshall was emotionally upset
throughout the entire incident and continued to cry after they had left
the worksite The next day Gottshall was sent back to the same track
as the day before, but only after being reprimanded by Conrail for
attempting to administer CPR to Johns. 6 Several days later, Gottshall
had become so preoccupied with the death of Johns, that he left work
sick and never returnedY.3 Gottshall was diagnosed as suffering from
major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.3 8 Afraid that he
24. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 358.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. d.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 359.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 360.
[Vol. 31:161
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would die in the same condition as Johns, Gottshall suffered from in-
somnia, loss of appetite, nightmares, and suicidal preoccupations.39
After two other doctors confirmed the diagnosis, Gottshall filed
an action against Conrail for emotional and physical injuries caused
by Conrail's alleged negligence in creating the circumstances sur-
rounding Johns' death."n The district court granted Conrail's motion
for summary judgment, reasoning that Gottshall had failed to satisfy
any elements of a recognized action for recovery.4 The Third Circuit
reversed and remanded for trial, holding that FELA's liberal recovery
policy should guide the court in determining whether the victim's
emotional injury was genuine, thus supporting a negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim.4 2
B. Carlisle v. Conrail
Alan Carlisle began working for Conrail when it was formed in
1976. 41 He started as a train dispatcher, but eventually became super-
visor of all rail operations in the Philadelphia area.' Carlisle's respon-
sibilities, as well as his stress, increased because of Conrail's sharp
reduction in its workforce and the risks involved in working with the
company's aging railstock and outdated switching equipment.45 Car-
lisle became increasingly anxious with Conrail's failure to alleviate
these safety concerns because of a potential slow-down in the raily-
ard's schedules.46
By 1988 Carlisle was a trainmaster, a position which required him
to work long hours in hazardous conditions.47 The cutbacks at Conrail
meant that Carlisle continued to work double duty as a supervisor of
dispatchers a.4  After a consecutive fifteen day stretch of working
twelve to fifteen hour days, Carlisle had a nervous breakdown.49 Car-
lisle testified that Conrail was non-responsive to his complaints re-
garding the excessive hours and stress of his job. °
39. Id
40. Id.
41. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 773 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
42. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993).
43. Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir. 1993).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 93.
1995]
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Carlisle filed a lawsuit in district court under FELA for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.5 1 He was successful in claiming that
Conrail was negligent in failing to provide a safe workplace due to the
unreasonably stressful and dangerous conditions.52 The Third Circuit
affirmed the jury verdict in favor of Carlisle.53 The opinion expanded
the court's holding in Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp. by impos-
ing liability on employers solely for emotional injuries caused by fore-
seeable job-related stress of their employees.54
C. Consolidated Action
The issues before the Supreme Court under the consolidated ac-
tions were (1) whether the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress was cognizable under FELA, and (2) if so, what was the
proper scope of the availability of recovery?55
III. PRIOR FELA JURISPRUDENCE
Damages for emotional distress have traditionally been recover-
able under FELA when accompanied by a physical injury.56 An em-
ployee could recover for his fright at the time of the accident and for
any "mental distress directly associated with his physical injuries." 57
Grief for the loss of friends in an accident was not recoverable.5 8 This
theory went generally unchallenged until the mid-1980s, when a flood
of litigation over emotional distress in the workplace began to reach
the federal courts.59
51. Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 790 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
52. Id.
53. Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993).
54. Id. at 97.
55. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2403 (1994).
56. See Erie R.R. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77, 85 (1920) (holding that a railroad employee may
recover damages for "shame and humiliation" caused by an injury resulting in personal disfig-
urement or mutilation); Bullard v. Central Vt. Ry., 565 F.2d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 1977) (limiting the
right to recover emotional damages by a railroad employee who was involved in an accident in
which he witnessed his friend's death).
57. Bullard, 565 F.2d at 197 n.3.
58. Id.
59. See Moody v. Maine Cent. R.R., 823 F.2d 693 (1st Cir. 1987); Puthe v. Exxon Shipping
Co., 2 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 1993); Holliday v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 914 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1990);
Elliott v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 910 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1990); Gaston v. Flowers Transp., 866 F.2d
816 (5th Cir. 1989); Adkins v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 821 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1987); Ray v. Consoli-
dated Rail Corp., 938 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1991); Buell v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 771 F.2d
1320 (9th Cir. 1985); Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R., 787 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1986).
6
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Prior to Consolidated Rail Corp., the Supreme Court's only op-
portunity to set a standard for the lower courts to follow was in Atchi-
son, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Buell. 0 The railway company
was making an appeal from an adverse Ninth Circuit decision which
held that wholly mental injuries were recoverable under FELA.61 The
Court in Atchison interpreted FELA's concept of "injury" as encom-
passing all reasonably foreseeable injuries caused by the employer's
failure to exercise due care.6' The Court reasoned that the term "in-
jury" was not qualified by any words such as "physical" or "bodily,"
which, considering FELA's liberal recovery policy, should allow dam-
ages for wholly mental injuries.6 3 The Supreme Court reserved the
question of whether the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of FELA was
correct because the record was insufficiently developed as to the exact
nature of the tortious activity and the extent of damages suffered.64
However, dicta by the Court suggested there may be recovery for
some types of emotional injury.65 The Court noted that this question
"is not necessarily an abstract point of law... that might be answer-
able without exacting scrutiny of the facts of the case.166 The develop-
ing common law, combined with the particular facts of the case,
precluded any broad pronouncement of the law in this area.67
There was no uniformity among the federal circuits in the appli-
cation of Atchison. The First Circuit noted that the Atchison decision
was "an attempt to leave the door to recovery for wholly emotional
injury somewhat ajar but not by any means wide open. '68 The opinion
in Atchison, which denies recovery for emotional distress absent a
physical impact, remained the law until Consolidated Rail Co.69
60. 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
61. Buell, 771 F.2d at 1324.
62. Id. at 1322.
63. Id. at 1323.
64. Atchison, 480 U.S. at 567 (1987).
65. Id. at 568-70.
66. Id. at 568.
67. Id. at 569-70.
68. Moody v. Maine Cent. R.R., 823 F.2d 693, 694 (1st Cir. 1987) (refusing to make a rail-
road worker's emotional injuries, allegedly the result of harassment at work, the pioneer case
after the Buell decision due to lack of causation). See also Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., 984
F.2d 1270 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to address the emotional distress issue because the underly-
ing negligence claim was not fully developed).
69. Bullard v. Central Vt. Ry., 565 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1977).
1995]
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In Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co. 7 0 the Second Circuit, in dicta,
indicated that recovery for wholly emotional injuries may be allowa-
ble. The standards set forth by the district court, requiring a "severe"
injury and "unconscionable abuse," were not essential elements for
recovery.71 The court declined to set any standards because the plain-
tiff had not met the basic elements of negligence.7
In Elliott v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.,73 the Fourth Circuit
refused to extend Atchison by recognizing a claim for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress. The Court stated that if such a claim was
cognizable under FELA, then "unconscionable abuse" or "outrageous
conduct" was a vital element.74
The Fifth Circuit initially implied that the "zone of danger" was
the appropriate scope of recovery for emotional injuries.75 A few
years later the court changed its position and allowed recovery for
emotional injuries without "physical injury. ' 7 6 A subsequent rehear-
ing en banc overruled the opinion, claiming there were insufficient
facts to determine the issue, and reemphasizing the "zone of danger"
test as the possible limit on recovery.77
The Sixth Circuit has refused to expand FELA liability to the
area of purely emotional injuries.78
70. 2 F.3d 480, 483 (2d Cir. 1993) (dismissing seaman's claim because emotional injuries,
caused by years of working at sea, were part of the job and therefore not foreseeable).
71. Id. (interpreting Atchison as not mandating courts, which hold such a claim viable under
FELA, to determine if there was a "severe" injury or "unconscionable abuse" before imposing
liability). See Atchison, 480 U.S. at 566 n. 13 (discussing standards which must be met to prove an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
72. Puthe, 2 F.3d at 483.
73. 910 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that despite the lack of physical
contact she suffered anxiety, insecurity, and hurt feelings due to disputes with her supervisors).
74. Id. at 1229 (assuming there is a claim under FELA recognizing emotional injuries, "un-
conscionable abuse" or "outrageous conduct" is an essential element to be proven; plaintiff
failed to show either).
75. Gaston v. Flowers Transp., 866 F.2d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to extend recov-
ery to a seaman who witnessed his half-brother crushed to death, but who was only a bystander
and not in the "zone of danger." The Court mentioned the dicta could be supported by Louisi-
ana's use of the "zone of danger" test in limited common law recovery.).
76. Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 937 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a claim for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress, without a physical injury, was cognizable under FELA, but
denied recovery because the accident was not foreseeable).
77. Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 966 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992) (overturning its prior holding that
a tugboat captain could recover for purely emotional injuries caused by witnessing a fire since
there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion).
78. See Adams v. CSX Transp., Inc., 899 F.2d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating in dicta that
an employer has not breached his duty to provide an emotionally safe workplace unless he has
acted with "unconscionable abuse"); Stoklosa v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 864 F.2d 425,426 (6th
Cir. 1988) (dismissing claim because essential element of negligence was missing); Cf. Adkins v.
Seaboard Sys. R.R., 821 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting plaintiff's FELA claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss1/4
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP. v. GOTTSHALL
The Seventh Circuit addressed this issue and found that "FELA
does not create a cause of action for tortious harms brought about by
acts which lack any physical contact or threat of physical contact. '79
The court has firmly stood by its "zone of danger" theory, even after
the Atchison decision.80
Since the Atchison ruling, the Ninth Circuit has accepted the
Supreme Court's "invitation" to extend FELA liability to purely emo-
tional injuries.8' Until the Third Circuit's recent findings in Gottshall
and Carlisle, the Ninth Circuit had been the only circuit to liberally
interpret FELAP
IV. DECISION IN CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP. v. GOTTSHALL
The Supreme Court settled the conflict among the circuits with its
holding in Consolidated Rail Corp.83 The Court declared that FELA
did allow claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. How-
ever, it limited recovery under FELA only to those persons within the
"zone of danger."'84
The Court analyzed the underlying intent and goals of the statute
to determine whether there was a right of action for emotional inju-
ries.8 5 The purpose of FELA was to shift "part of the 'human over-
head' of doing business in the railroad industry from the employees to
the employers. 8 6 The Court, noting its past liberal construction of the
statute, interpreted "injury" to encompass emotional, as well as physi-
cal, injuries.87 This remedial goal, considered with the notion that
79. Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 773 F.2d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding the railroad
liable for emotional distress caused by the abusive conduct of several supervisors towards an
employee; the conduct included incidents and threats of physical contact).
80. See Ray v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 938 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1991) (reaffirming Lancaster
in light of Atchison by denying recovery for an employee who allegedly suffered emotional inju-
ries caused by verbal harassment from his supervisor); Hammond v. Terminal R.R. Assoc., 848
F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1988) (refusing to extend Atchison, thereby precluding recovery for emotional
injuries caused by harassment, criticism, and a heavy workload).
81. Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R., 787 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1986) (maintaining its position in
Atchison; despite some reservations, the court allowed recovery for wholly emotional injuries
caused by an employer's harassment).
82. Id.
83. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
84. Id. at 2411.
85. Id. at 2403-04.
86. Id. at 2404 (quoting Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 58 (1943)).
87. Id. (citing Rogers v. Missouri P. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) (holding that a relaxed stan-
dard of causation exists under FELA)).
1995]
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"FELA jurisprudence gleans guidance from common law develop-
ments," was the determining factor behind the Court's acceptance of
the claim. 8
After the Court concluded that there was a right of recovery
under FELA, it focused on the more difficult task of determining the
proper scope of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.89 It
first acknowledged the difference between pain and suffering, which
traditionally has been associated with physical injury, and emotional
distress, which is not directly brought about by a physical injury.90 The
Court was guided by the common law tests developed to limit recov-
ery for emotional injury.9' Conrail supported the adoption of the
"zone of danger" test while arguing against the Third Circuit's "genu-
ineness" test.92 After careful analysis of the common law concerns re-
garding negligent infliction of emotional distress claims and the
underlying principles of FELA, the Supreme Court adopted the "zone
of danger" test because it was the best way to reconcile the two
interests.93
V. ANALYSIS
The initial question addressed by the Supreme Court was
whether negligent infliction of emotional distress was a recognized
cause of action under FELA.94 In the early 1900s railroads were a
major source of transportation for goods and people in the United
States. Congress, aware that railroading resulted in death and injuries
to thousands of workers each year, enacted FELA for the purpose of
forcing the railroad industry to assume "some of the cost for the legs,
eyes, arms, and lives which it consumed in its operations."95 The stat-
ute abolished some of the traditional common law tort defenses, such
as the fellow servant rule and contributory negligence, which had
barred recovery for many injured workers.96
88. Id. at 2403 (citing Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568 (1987)).
89. Id. at 2405.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2408; Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993); Carlisle V.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993).
93. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
94. Id. at 2403.
95. Id. at 2404 (citing Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
96. Id.
[Vol. 31:161
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The legislative history of FELA sheds light on some of the goals
intended by Congress in its adoption. 7 First, the statute was intended
to hold employers liable for an employee's injury due to the negli-
gence of a co-employee.9 8 Second, FELA was designed to eradicate
the notion that workers have notice of dangers in the workplace and
therefore assume the risk.99 Third, the law of contributory negligence
was expressly modified with respect to the scope-of the statute.100 Fi-
nally, agreements contracting away liability of employers were se-
verely curtailed.10 The overall stated purpose of FELA was to
promote the welfare of the employees who were involved in very dan-
gerous but essential occupations. This was accomplished by shifting
liability to the corporations who profited from their work. 0 2 In Urie v.
Thompson, the Court recognized that FELA was a broad remedial
statute which should be governed by a standard of liberal construction
in order to achieve its stated purpose. 0 3 This interpretation has
guided the courts in FELA litigation for over forty years."°
The Court correctly decided that a negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress claim is available under FELA 5 Many jurisdictions at
the time of FELA's enactment had already recognized some form of
recovery for emotional injury claims. 06 This recognition has increased
almost universally to the present date. 07 FELA was founded on prin-
ciples of common law negligence and injury, subject to the modifica-
tions imposed by Congress in 1908.108 Although negligence under
97. Gaston v. Flowers Transp., 866 F.2d 816, 817 (5th Cir. 1989) (analyzing the 1908 Senate
Report to determine purposes behind statute).
98. Id (discussing S. REP. No. 460,60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1908)) (abolishing the common
law fellow servant defense with respect to FELA claims. The policy reasons behind precluding
employer liability when a co-worker's negligence causes the injury have diminished due to the
growing complexity and diversification of the railroad industry.).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 818.
103. 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949) (interpreting silicosis as an "injury" under FELA in light of the
statute's accepted liberal construction, its humanitarian purposes, the absence of negative legis-
lative history, and the breadth of the statutory language).
104. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568 (1987); Rogers v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 948 F.2d 858, 862 (2d Cir. 1991); Moody v. Boston & Me. Corp., 921 F.2d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 1990); Ackley v. Chicago & N.W. Transp., 820 F.2d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1987); Edsall v. Penn
Cent. Transp., 479 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1973).
105. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2407-08 (1994) (making only
recovery "official" because some form of the physical impact or "zone of danger" test had been
recognized through an opinion or by dicta in virtually every circuit).
106. Id. at 2407.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2404; Gaston v. Flowers Transp., 866 F.2d 816, 817 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing S.
RnP. No. 460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1908).
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FELA is a federal question, common law is an essential supplement
and guide in helping the courts determine this issue. 10 9 An official dec-
laration by the circuit courts, as well as the Supreme Court, recogniz-
ing a right of recovery for emotional injuries has been side-stepped for
the last fifteen years.110
However, further research finds that Erie Railroad v. Collins"'
and Bullard v. Central Virginia Railway"12 did acknowledge this right
of recovery years before the mid-1980s. So why is there still a contro-
versy as to whether an employee may recover for emotional injuries
under FELA? Realistically, there is no question as to the existence of
a claim for emotional distress, thus enabling the Supreme Court to
easily decide the issue.1 3 A careful look at the many opinions by the
circuit courts dealing with this issue reveals that all of the employees
attempting to recover damages did so solely on the basis of emotional
injuries. 114 Therefore, the underlying question addressed by the cases
was not whether a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim was
viable under FELA, but rather to what extent should that right of
recovery be limited.15
The Supreme Court has held that mental injuries resulting from a
physical impact or injury are recoverable under FELA.116 The First
Circuit in Bullard determined that an employee could recover for any
mental injuries caused by a physical injury or the fright suffered during
109. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949); Consolidated Railway Corp., 114 S. Ct. at
2408.
110. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987); Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping
Co., 984 F.2d 1270 (1st Cir. 1993); Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co., 2 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 1993); Elliott
v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 910 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1990); Gaston v. Flowers Transp., 866 F.2d 816 (5th
Cir. 1989); Adams v. CSX Transp., 899 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1990) (dismissing claims for various
reasons before the issue of recovering for emotional distress was addressed).
111. 253 U.S. 77, 87 (1920).
112. 565 F.2d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 1977).
113. Consolidated Railway Corp., 114 S. Ct at 2407-08.
114. See Atchison, 480 U.S. at 557 (alleging harassment by fellow employees caused plaintiff
to suffer an emotional breakdown); Moody v. Maine Cent. R.R., 823 F.2d 693 (1st Cir. 1987)
(claiming the railroad's continued harassment, in the form of unattractive assignments and de-
nial of admission to a training program, caused employee to suffer fatigue and depression); El-
lenwood, 984 F.2d at 1270 (alleging railroad's policy, which adversely affected the plaintiff,
caused him emotional distress); Puthe, 2 F.3d at 480 (alleging psychological injuries caused by a
series of negligent actions by railroad); See also Holliday v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 914 F.2d
421 (3d Cir. 1990); Elliott, 910 F.2d at 1224; Gaston, 866 F.2d at 816; Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc.,
937 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1991); Adams, 899 F.2d at 536; Hammond v. Terminal R.R. Assoc. St.L.,
848 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1988); Ray v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 938 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1991); Taylor
v. Burlington N. R.R., 787 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1986).
115. See Bullard, 565 F.2d at 197.
116. Erie R.R. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77, 85-86 (1920).
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an accident, thereby essentially adopting the "zone of danger" test. 7
Almost all other circuits have expressed, either through opinions or
dicta, that emotional distress caused by a physical impact or threat of
a physical impact would be recognized under FELA as a legitimate
right of recovery.1 8 The implied issue in Consolidated Rail Corp. was
whether the Court should adopt the rulings of Erie, Bullard, and Ray
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., utilizing the "zone of danger" analysis, or
the Third Circuit's "genuineness" test, which considers FELA's liberal
recovery policy.
The Court first analyzed the Third Circuit's reasoning in support
of the "genuineness" test. The Court particularly focused on whether
the test would be effective and consistent in determining the validity
of the emotional distress while having the ability to guard against the
numerous problems inherent in these types of claims. 119 The "genu-
ineness" inquiry asks "whether the factual circumstances ... provide a
threshold assurance that there is a likelihood of genuine and serious
emotional injury.' 20 The Third Circuit's analysis then evaluated the
claim by the traditional concepts of negligence: duty, breach, causa-
tion, and foreseeability.' 2' This standard might not have been struck
down so quickly by the Court except for the fact that the Third Circuit
in Carlisle refined the test and virtually did away with any common
law negligence analysis.122 Whether the evidence showed the injury to
be genuine and serious, and whether it was foreseeable, became the
main issues in determining liability under FELA in the Third Cir-
cuit.1' The Supreme Court dismissed this test as being "fatally flawed
in a number of respects."' 24
The Third Circuit treated the various common law tests, such as
the "physical impact," "zone of danger," and "bystander recovery"
117. Bullard v. Central Vt. Ry., 565 F.2d 193, 197 (1st. Cir. 1977) (acknowledging that the
"physical" impact requirement was not as essential to recovery when the plaintiff suffers only a
very minor injury, but still recovers damages for emotional injury because he was exposed to a
potentially life-threatening accident); See also Ray, 938 F.2d at 705 (adopting the "zone of dan-
ger" test as the standard for determining liability in the Seventh Circuit).
118. See Moody, 823 F.2d at 696; Ellenwood, 984 F.2d at 1282; Puthe, 2 F.3d at 482; Holliday,
914 F.2d at 426; Elliott, 910 F.2d at 1228; Gaston, 866 F.2d at 821; Adams, 899 F.2d at 539;
Hammond, 848 F.2d at 96; Ray, 938 F.2d at 705; Taylor, 787 F.2d at 1313.
119. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2408 (1994).
120. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 371 (3d Cir. 1993).
121. Id. at 374.
122. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. CL at 2401; Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d
90 (3d Cir. 1993).
123. See Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 98.
124. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2408.
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tests, as arbitrary and easily discarded if they stood in the way of re-
covery of a "meritorious" claim.'2 However, since FELA does not
expressly address the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress,
the common law concepts of this cause of action should be applied
when determining liability.126 The underlying concerns of the courts
have been to guard against unpredictable and infinite liability as well
as fraudulent claims.2 7 If the common law tests, which have been de-
veloped and refined since the first of the century, could not be used in
the analysis of emotional distress claims, the courts would have to em-
bark on a course that would eventually establish an unprecedented
form of liability. Railroads and shipping companies will be subjected
to a standard which goes far beyond any remedial goals or "humanita-
rian" purposes Congress intended for FELA.128
The Supreme Court has been adamant in stressing that FELA is
not a workers' compensation statute. 29 The employer is not his em-
ployees' insurer; his liability is based on negligence, not the fact that
the injury occurred.130 Abandoning the wisdom and insight of ninety
years of jurisprudence would only lower the defenses of the courts
against fraudulent claims, thus opening the door for any employee,
whether or not injured on the job, to recover damages from his
employer.
The dissent argued that the concern about infinite liability to an
infinite number of people is sufficiently diminished since FELA is
only available to a small number of employees who work in the rail-
road or shipping industry.131 They interpreted the fact that the statute
is to be liberally construed as meaning Congress intended for FELA
to provide a federal "statutory negligence action... significantly dif-
ferent from the ordinary common law negligence action.' 32 It is true
that the legislative purpose of FELA was to shift the disproportionate
costs of injuries from employees to the railroad companies who have
benefitted from the labor. 33 The congressional intent, however, was
not to impose a form of strict liability upon the railroad industry, but
125. Id.
126. See Monessen S.W. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 336-39 (1988).
127. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct at 2405.
128. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988); S. REP. No. 460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1908).
129. Ellis v. Union P. R.R., 329 U.S. 649 (1947).
130. Id at 653.
131. Consolidated Railroad Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2412 (Ginsburg, J., Blackmun, J., and Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
132. Rogers v. Missouri P. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 509-10 (1957).
133. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring).
[Vol. 31:161
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rather to provide the employees a federal forum and remedy in the
pursuit of valid claims. 34
The dissent attempted to extend FELA's departures from some
aspects of the common law, dealing with specific applications to the
statute, to its overall function.'35 The fact that Congress and the
Supreme Court have furthered the statute's purpose by abandoning
the common law defenses traditionally available to the railroads in
favor of liberal interpretations of its language does not mean that all
common law concepts are to be ignored when deciding these cases. 36
Only a liberal interpretation would permit the Court to think Con-
gress would have wanted to erase from FELA all contact with the
common law, thus depriving the federal courts of ninety years of
jurisprudence.
The Third circuit suggested that the "genuineness" test was a suf-
ficient restriction on claims by providing some finite limit to the rail-
road's liability. 3 7 But the determination of whether an injury is
"genuine" as the only threshold test precluding liability is too fact spe-
cific and inconsistent to guard acceptably against the underlying evils
inherent in this type of claim. 3 ' Emotional injuries are not always
supportable by objective medical proof, placing judges in the difficult
position of having to make highly subjective decisions concerning the
viability and authenticity of emotional claims. 139 There is no consis-
tent standard by which employers can conform their behavior to avoid
liability.'40 Employers, such as Conrail, would not only have to look
out for the physical safety of their employees, which it has a duty to
do, but they would also have to be aware of and protect the delicate
psyches of numerous workers.' 4' What would prevent an employee
from bringing his personal problems to work, totally unknown to his
134. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
135. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2413 (Ginsburg, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
136. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988); S. REP. 460,60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1908); Rogers, 352 U.S.
at 506.
137. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 379 (3d Cir. 1993).
138. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2409.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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employer, and letting them manifest into symptoms of emotional dis-
tress caused by some hardship at work?141 Such an arbitrary and in-
consistent analysis, when dealing with intangible harms caused by
negligence, is unacceptable. 43
Carlisle's claim is proof of this problem. 44 He claimed to have
suffered insomnia, headaches, depression, and weight loss because he
was subjected to stressful conditions resulting from working long
hours with allegedly faulty equipment. 45 There is no way to be suffi-
ciently certain that Carlisle's emotional distress was not caused by
some outside influence.
Opponents to the Supreme Court's decision argue that Carlisle's
claim might be "genuine," therefore causing him to go uncompen-
sated for Conrail's negligence.' 46 However, a line must be drawn even
if it precludes recovery for some legitimate injuries. The rejection of
the inconsistent and highly subjective "genuineness" test was the cor-
rect determination by the Supreme Court.147
The reliance on foreseeability as a limitation for liability was an-
other flaw in the Third Circuit's reasoning in support of the "genuine-
ness" test.148 Scrutinized closely, every consequence of a negligent act
could be found to be foreseeable. It is possible that any employee
could have suffered fear and anxiety upon hearing the circumstances
surrounding Johns' death in Gottshall, and this emotional distress
could possibly be found to have been foreseeable by Conrail. 49
"Every injury has ramifying consequences.., without end. The prob-
lem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a con-
trollable degree." 50 Foreseeability is not only an insufficient
safeguard against infinite liability, but would probably have the oppo-
site and disastrous effect of allowing recovery to whomever could see
the farthest.
An employer has a duty "to avoid subjecting its employees to
negligently inflicted emotional injury.' 15' The Supreme Court, after
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993).
145. Id. at 92.
146. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gotshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2417 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., Black-
mun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 2409.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969).
151. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gotshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2408 (1994).
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reviewing the Third Circuit's "genuineness" test, followed its own wis-
dom and analyzed the common law in determining the correct limita-
tion on employer liability.'52 It accepted the "zone of danger" test,
which was supported by Conrail, as best reconciling the concerns of
the common law with the principles underlying FELA. 53
The Court's reasoning in support of adopting the "zone of dan-
ger" test was sound, logical, and consistent. It combined the essential
historical aspects of this right of recovery with FELA's broad reme-
dial goals to reach a well-balanced median which is consistent and fair
in determining the liabilities and rights of the parties.154 When FELA
was enacted in 1908, the right to recover for emotional distress was
well established throughout most common law jurisdictions. 5 5 The
two prevailing rules of liability were the "physical impact" and "zone
of danger" tests. 56 Although the "physical impact" was the more fa-
vored rule throughout the United States, 57 the "zone of danger" test
was adopted by many jurisdictions as a more progressive rule of
law.158
Analyzing the issue of emotional distress in its historical context,
the Supreme Court determined that Congress intended to limit liabil-
ity for negligent infliction of emotional distress through the "zone of
danger" test.'5 9 As this test was the more liberal of the two it con-
formed to the statute's purposes and goals of broad recovery for em-
ployees. 60 Logical and consistent application of stare decisis supports
this historical analysis.' 6 ' The Court used its line of reasoning in Mon-
essen Southwestern Railroad Co. v. Morgan62 as a basis for approach-
ing and analyzing the issue in Consolidated Railroad Corp. The Court
found that the right to recover pre-judgment interest was found not to
have existed in the common law in 1908, and therefore determined it
was not allowed under FELA in 1988.163 By using this uniform
152. Id. See also Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949).
153. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2411.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2405.
156. Id. at 2406.
157. Archibald H. Throckrnorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HA~v. L. REv. 260, 264 (1921).
158. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2410.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 486 U.S. 330, (1988) Id. at 337-38 (determining whether pre-judgment interest was re-
coverable under FELA, the Court used hindsight to see if it was recoverable in 1908. Since
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method of historical analysis, the Supreme Court established a consis-
tent and fair way of alerting parties to the various rights of recovery
and defenses not expressly stated in the statute.164
The dissent attacked the credibility of the majority's historical
reasoning by arguing that it was inconsistent and lacked a clear point
of reference.165 They argued that if relative support among the juris-
dictions was the determining factor in choosing a rule of liability, then
either the "physical impact" or the "bystander" test would be appro-
priate, depending on whether the focus was on the past or present,
respectively.1 66
The dissent's argument fails by looking too much at the surface of
the majority's reasoning, entirely missing the foundation underlying
its historical analysis. First, the exact jurisdictional numbers support-
ing each test were not the sole factor in determining which rule was
best under FELA to limit liability. The Court cited the continued sup-
port for the "zone of danger" test from 1908 to the present as one
distinguishing positive factor in adopting the test as the measuring
stick for FELA emotional distress claims.' 67 Support for the "physical
impact" test has waned over the years, and "bystander" recovery was
not recognized for over sixty years after the enactment of FELA. 6 s
The Court followed a point of reference, eighty-five years old, in de-
termining that the "zone of danger" test has been the most established
and consistently applied of the three major liability rules, thereby
avoiding the inevitable problems inherent in an out-of-date or un-
proven test. 69
Another factor in the Court's analysis was the consistency of the
"zone of danger" test with FELA's focus on physical perils.' 70 FELA's
language refers only to an "injury," which the Court correctly held as
encompassing both physical and mental injuries.1 7 1 However, the stat-
ute's primary purpose is to compensate employees who are injured or
Congress expressly dealt with the well-established defense doctrines, such as contributory negli-
gence, but did not even mention the established principle barring recovery of pre-judgment in-
terest; the Court concluded that Congress intended to leave the unmentioned common law intact
and expected the courts to use it in determining FELA claims).
164. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2410.
165. Id. at 2417.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2410.
168. Id. at 2411.
169. Id at 2410.
170. Id. (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181 (1949) (recognizing the Congressional
intention to primarily focus on deaths and injuries resulting from railroad accidents).
171. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2410.
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killed by the hazardous conditions of the railroad and shipping indus-
tries. 72 One purpose of FELA was to encourage employers to imple-
ment safety measures which would alleviate the physical dangers and
lower the number of claims filed. 173 The "zone of danger" test is a
logical and consistent rule which allows an employee to recover for
emotional injuries caused by the threat of a physical impact. 174 This
test best facilitates Congress' goals of alleviating physical dangers and
allowing recovery to all injuries caused by the imminent threat of
these dangers. 175
The Court went further and expressly rejected both the "physical
impact" test and the "bystander" recovery rule as inappropriate limi-
tations under FELA jurisprudence. 176 In evaluating the tests, it is
clearly evident that the "zone of danger" test encompasses all the
characteristics of the "physical impact" test, with the exception of
physical injury.177 Therefore, it cannot seriously be argued that the
"physical impact" test should have some viability under FELA. At
the opposite end of the spectrum, the "bystander" test is insufficient in
governing FELA claims because of its lack of historical support and
the instability of its recovery limits.' 78 This test is twenty-five years old
and, even though it is followed in roughly half the states, the majority
of these jurisdictions limit its application to bystanders who witness a
relative suffer a severe injury or death.179 This would be a completely
impractical limitation on FELA recovery because employees rarely
work side by side with their relatives. 8 ' The argument that some
states have done away with this "relative" requirement does not jus-
tify basing an almost century-old statute on a new and speculative
theory.'"
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Consolidated Rail Corp. will have a settling effect
on the confusion surrounding employers' liability under FELA. The
172. Id (citing Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. R.R., 773 F.2d 807, 813 (1985)).
173. Id Cf. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (stating FELA's purpose was to
shift the burden of personal injuries on the job from the employees to the employers, and em-
phasizing that the exercise of proper care by employer's would alleviate this burden).
174. Id. at 2411.
175. Id.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. Id
179. Id.
180. Id
181. Id.
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adoption of the "zone of danger" test allows every railroad and ship-
ping employer to know exactly the extent of its liability for negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims, enabling them to take measures
to avoid such claims. The test also helps employees gauge the validity
of their claim, thus curtailing any unnecessary or unwarranted litiga-
tion that can accompany emotional injuries. Also, two competing, but
equally important, considerations are harmoniously brought together
by the "zone of danger" test. First, FELA's main purpose of protect-
ing employees from injury by allowing them a liberal recovery forum
is still present since the test allows for recovery without a physical
injury. Second, the historical common law concerns of the uncertainty
surrounding emotional claims are best alleviated by this test. Cer-
tainty is a highly important ingredient in our legal system, and the
Supreme Court finally shut the door on the uncertainty it left open
eight years ago in Atchison.
Alan C. Buckner
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